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Joaquín M. Azagra-Caro 
 
Background 
This work was initially a report for Directorate-General for Research. The Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) is one of the seven institutes of the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC). ERAWATCH is a long-term initiative jointly 
carried out by the Directorates-General for Research and JRC - IPTS. The ERAWATCH 
Intelligence service aims to provide regular and ongoing analyses of issues relevant to 
research policy-making. 
Executive summary 
Support to university patent ownership is a popular R&D policy initiative to promote 
effective knowledge sharing. Yet the broader, unintentional, consequences of such support 
on the link between public funding of university R&D and increased university-industry 
cooperation have not been studied. Through regression models on the determinants of 
university-owned patents in the EU and US, tentative results illustrate that the risk of 
negative consequences exists. Complementing current metrics about university 
performance with statistics about business patents with university inventors would help 
avoid such a risk and find definitive quantitative evidence. 
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Introduction: the extent of the promotion of university-
owned patents and their use for indicators of university 
activities 
Universities apply for different forms of intellectual property right (IPR) protection, like 
patents, and obtain their ownership according to the respective national regulations. The 
trend for universities to apply for patents has been increasing in the European Union (EU) 
for the last thirty years, popularising their use to build indicators about the technological 
production of universities and their potential contribution to industrial applications. 
Current opinion recognises that owning IPR and – more concretely – patents, is an 
important asset for sharing knowledge between universities and industry1. Patent 
ownership (as a precondition for licenses) is one of the criteria advocated for further 
justifying the allocation of funding for universities in addition to other, traditional, criteria 
such as teaching output, publications and research grant income generated.2 
The issue of how to manage intellectual property rights (IPR) once university research 
produces patentable results is a matter of debate. Some suggested measures are the 
harmonisation of national legal frameworks regarding the litigation system, grace period, 
joint ownership regime, research exception, etc.3 In some countries, this strategy is even 
linked to national key challenges for R&D and growth. For instance, this is how Germany 
justified abolishing professors' privilege to use the results of R&D for patent applications 
and establishing agencies, located in universities, for utilising patents.4 The same applies 
to Denmark in 1999 with the passage of the Act of Inventions at Public Research 
Institutions.5 
Therefore, university patent ownership has received support in the form of merit valuation 
in researchers’ CVs (for example, exploited patents count for the improvement of salary 
conditions in Spain6), monetary incentives (revenue sharing between the institution and 
the researcher) or managerial advances (knowledge transfer offices often justify their 
mission showing patent counts as one of their outputs). 
                                            
1 Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161, p.16. 
2 Commission communication ‘Delivering on the modernisation agenda for universities: education, research 
and innovation’, COM(2006) 208, p.7-8. 
3 Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161, p.17. 
4 ERAWATCH Research Inventory: Germany 
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=ri.content&topicID=24&parentID=624&countryCode=
DE&UUID=26F3D32F-9352-6F34-89BCF14243F5D7E5&hwd=patent, last access: 12/08/2008.  
5 ERAWATCH Research Inventory: Denmark 
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=ri.content&topicID=49&parentID=44&countryCode=D
K&UUID=26EAF9CA-089F-899A-CB0BE83C35A2F0E3&hwd=patent, last access: 12/08/2008. 
6 Spanish Official Bulletin, ‘Resolución de 11 de noviembre de 2008, de la Presidencia de la Comisión 
Nacional Evaluadora de la Actividad Investigadora, por la que se establecen los criterios específicos en 
cada uno de los campos de evaluación’, BOE 282: p. 46906-46913. 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2008/11/22/pdfs/A46906-46914.pdf, last access: 09/01/2009. 
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One reason for this support is the assumption that, by owning IPR, universities may play a 
bigger role in innovation and economic development (through, e.g. the creation of spinoffs. 
In the current policy context, the ownership of IPR by universities is the result of effective 
knowledge sharing, i.e. university-industry cooperation in the form of shared principles for 
knowledge transfer7. Nevertheless, there is no single policy objective regarding university-
industry cooperation. Actually, university-industry cooperation lies behind the objective of 
‘strengthening research institutions’8, which prompts the question, does university-industry 
cooperation towards ‘strengthening research institutions’ also lead to university patent 
ownership? 
An intuitive reaction would give a positive reply, but there are some reasons to argue the 
opposite. In the next sections we disentangle what university-industry cooperation 
represents for the objective of ‘strengthening research institutions’ and present the 
reasons why (and some evidence that) it may not be always compatible with the objective 
of ‘effective knowledge sharing’ through university patent ownership. 
‘Strengthening research institutions’ 
Universities are increasingly being encouraged to recognise that their relationship with the 
business community is of strategic importance and forms part of their commitment to 
serving the public interest.9 If research institutions in Europe are to become stronger, 
public-private cooperation should take the form of routine interaction and durable 
partnerships between research institutions, notably universities, and the world of 
business10. This interaction will strengthen research institutions in at least two ways: they 
will allow universities to cope with different sources of funding and they will encourage 
their performance. Table 1 sums-up these objectives and advances some possible 
measures, in order to facilitate the reading of the document. More in-depth explanations 
follow. 
Strong research institutions will forge sufficient links with business and society, adapting to 
the intensified competition for funding11. An indicator of progress could be the composition 
of university R&D by source of funding12. When looking at university-industry cooperation, 
the proportion of business funding of university R&D over total university expenditure on 
R&D appears to be an adequate indicator. 
In second place, strong research institutions need to forge innovative public-private 
partnerships, which link public funding to output and performance, (labelled ‘encouraging 
performance’ here)13. An indicator of progress should measure the success of such 
                                            
7 Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161, p.8. 
8 Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161, p.8. 
9 Commission communication ‘Delivering on the modernisation agenda for universities: education, research 
and innovation’, COM(2006) 208. 
10 Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161, p.8. 
11 Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161, p.14. 
12 EC, 2008. A more research-intensive and integrated European Research Area: Science, Technology and 
Competitiveness key figures report 2008/2009. Belgium: European Commission, p. 96-97. 
13 Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161, p.15. 
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collaboration. A possible candidate, the proportion of business funding of university R&D 
over total university R&D, is insufficient for that. Instead, the proportion of business patents 
with university inventors over total business patents is an interesting alternative. A 
business patent with university inventors indicates that the collaboration has been 
successful enough for the firm to engage into the further cost of protecting the results, as 
well as the fact (recognised by law) that the collaboration has produced an invention of 
potential industrial application. 
Table 1. Policy sub-objectives of ‘strengthening research institutions’ linked to university-
industry cooperation 
Sub-objective Definition Possible measure 
Coping with 
diversification of 
funding 
Improving the compatibility of the 
diversification of sources of 
funding for universities 
(especially increasing business 
funding) with the maintenance of 
academic output and its 
orientation towards more 
technological applications  
Proportion of business 
funding of university R&D 
over total university 
expenditure on R&D 
Encouraging 
performance 
Increasing the actual 
incorporation of university 
knowledge into business 
technology 
Proportion of business 
patents with university 
inventors over total business 
patents 
 
Business funding of university R&D, which this work used as a measure of the objective of 
‘coping with diversification of funding’, can partly capture this collaboration, and therefore 
there is an overlap with the objective of ‘encouraging performance’. However, business 
patents with university inventors can be the result of joint research without business 
funding of university R&D, for instance when a public programme funds both the university 
and the firm. Moreover, joint research may not lead to business patents with university 
inventors but to other types of outputs, not to say that it may be unsuccessful. 
Hence, business patents with university inventors measure a particular type of university-
industry cooperation – one that accounts for the actual incorporation of university 
knowledge into business technology better than business funding of university R&D. 
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Advantages and disadvantages of the objectives of 
‘coping with diversification of funding’ and 
‘encouraging performance’ for university patent 
ownership at aggregate level, with an empirical test 
Some policy documents argue that there is complementarity between several objectives 
regarding knowledge transfer, including those related to the promotion of university patent 
ownership14. In this section, we try to find the grounds, together with possible caveats that 
would justify some debate15, and present some empirical evidence. Table 2 supplements 
the reasons given in the main body text, without aiming at being exhaustive. 
Structured partnerships with the business community bring opportunities to improve “the 
sharing of research results, IPR, patents and licenses”16. Therefore, the sub-objective 
‘coping with diversification of funding’ should have a positive impact on university patent 
ownership. One assumption is that private involvement in university R&D may increase the 
number of patents owned by universities17. For instance, the 2006 collaborative research 
initiative in Latvia aims at fostering private R&D funds and university owned patents 
simultaneously since 'the selection criteria [for universities to be eligible for funding] 
include the level of experience of the research organisations in the commercialisation of 
their research results'.18 The determinants of ‘commercialisation’ in this initiative are the 
'number of patent applications, the amount of funding attracted from the private sector, 
[and] the number of co-operation agreements'.19 Another assumption is that the cultural 
differences between the business and the science communities hinder efficient knowledge 
transfer. Actually, member states may consider it necessary to act simultaneously on both, 
                                            
14 For instance, the Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, 
COM(2007) 161 finds complementarity between ‘strengthening research institutions’ and ‘effective 
knowledge sharing’. The Commission communication ‘Improving knowledge transfer between research 
institutions and industry across Europe: embracing open innovation’, COM(2007) finds complementarity 
between ‘creating the conditions for successful knowledge transfer’ and ‘promoting an entrepreneurial 
mindset’. The Commission recommendation ‘on the management of intellectual property in knowledge 
transfer activities and Code of Practice for universities and other public research organisations’, COM(2008) 
1329 finds complementarity between ‘developing knowledge transfer policy’ and collaborative and contract 
research, etc. 
15 Such debate has been very vivid in the academic world. As a few examples, take: 
Geuna, A., Nesta, L.J., 2006. University patenting and its effects on academic research: The emerging 
European evidence. Research Policy 35: 790-807. 
Mowery, D. C., Nelson, R. R., Sampat, B. N., Ziedonis, A. A., 2001. The growth of patenting and licensing by 
U.S. universities: an assessment of the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Research Policy 30: 99-119. 
Rappert, B., Webster, A., Charles, D., 1999. Making sense of diversity and reluctance: academic-industrial 
relations and intellectual property. Research Policy 28: 873-890. 
16 Commission communication ‘Delivering on the modernisation agenda for universities: education, research 
and innovation’, COM(2006) 208, p.6. 
17 Commission communication ‘Improving knowledge transfer between research institutions and industry 
across Europe: embracing open innovation’, COM(2007) 182, p.4. 
18 ERAWATCH Research Inventory: Latvia 
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=ri.content&topicID=59&parentID=329&countryCode=
LV&UUID=3E071F4D-BCDC-BBA0-DE984326D2D746BB&hwd=patent, last access: 12/08/2008.  
19 Op. cit.  
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e.g. the Greek Patent Office has reduced patenting and search fees, and is trying to raise 
awareness among public researchers and private firms about the benefits of patenting.20 
Table 2. Selected types of expected impact of ‘coping with diversification of funding’ and 
‘encouraging performance’ on university patent ownership 
Sub-objective Reasons for a positive impact on 
university patent ownership 
Reasons for a negative impact 
on university patent ownership 
Coping with 
diversification of 
funding 
(i) Possibility of extending protection 
from a national patent office to an 
international patent office through 
the addition of a business firm in the 
international co-application21, even 
in the absence of scientific 
knowledge exchange 
(ii) Chance to learn about specific 
technological content/issues, 
application potential of various 
technologies and IPR management 
models, typically from the private 
sector, which universities will use to 
claim ownership of the research 
results from publicly-funded projects 
(subject to the existence of national 
legislation which permits it) 
Business funding of university 
R&D results in business patents 
with university inventors or in 
results not protected by patents 
Encouraging 
performance 
(i) Virtuous circle of high quality 
research that promotes synergies 
between university-owned patents 
and business patents with university 
inventors 
(ii) Universities and countries may 
be able to have some research 
groups specialised in university-
owned patents and some others in 
business patents with university 
inventors 
If the incentive for participating 
in inventions patented by firms 
is high, university researchers 
will devote less of their limited 
amount of time and resources 
to research leading to 
university-owned patents 
 
However, the objective of ‘coping with diversification of funding’ rarely discusses the 
mechanisms through which private involvement in university R&D results in university-
owned patents. In the US case, it is true that MIT owns almost all of its inventions and 
                                            
20 ERAWATCH Research Inventory: Greece 
http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=ri.content&topicID=15&parentID=12&countryCode=G
R&UUID=26EBDE7D-C488-52FA-7C26D8051A70BA08&hwd=patent, last access: 12/08/2008. 
21 European Commission, 2008: ‘CREST report: Intellectual property: Cross-border collaboration between 
publicly funded research organisations and industry and technology transfer training’. EUR 20796. 
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many other US universities manage to do the same. However, many European universities 
have found it difficult to negotiate IPR ownership for contracted activities. An exception is 
the UK, where Lamberts model contracts were drawn up specifically for this reason to 
guide universities and industry (including model agreements in which universities are to 
own IPR). Overall, at aggregate level, what happens at individual universities or even 
countries is not determining. Certainly, business funding may have indirect, positive, 
effects on the university, for instance those reported in Table 2. 
Some evidence to verify whether the objective of ‘coping with diversification of funding’ 
complements university-owned patents at aggregate level is therefore welcome to better 
tailor policies in this area. 
The following evidence presents the results of estimating the impact of a measure of the 
objective of ‘coping with diversification of funding’ on the production of university-owned 
patents in the 27 EU Member States plus the United States (US). 
We measure the objective of ‘coping with diversification of funding’ through business 
funding of R&D. The estimated impact takes into account differences across countries in 
terms of the scale of university R&D and other inventive inputs. Details on the data and 
methodology appear in the annex. 
In Figure 1, the blue line represents the impact of an increase in the variable used to 
measure the objective of ‘coping with diversification of funding’, i.e. the percentage of 
business funding of university R&D over total university R&D expenditure: the higher this 
share, the greater the number of patents owned by universities. University patent 
ownership and the objective of ‘coping with diversification of funding’ supported by 
university-industry cooperation are therefore complementary. 
The expectation of a positive impact of the sub-objective of ‘encouraging performance’ on 
university patent ownership relies on the idea that public-private research partnerships and 
excellent research can take place simultaneously through instruments such as the EU 
R&D Framework Programme22. Further increasing complementarity would be desirable in 
order to overcome the perception that industry has not developed sufficient absorptive 
capacity to harness the potential of university-based research.23 Actually, many pleas for 
the benefits of improving internal IP (and IP transfer) policies at universities come with 
objectives to enhance joint research resulting in business patents with university 
inventors24. 
In theory, both goals may occur simultaneously, since universities or countries should be 
able to organise their researchers to achieve them at the same time, and policy documents 
suggest it is possible. At individual level, though, some reasons indicate the opposite: for 
researchers, the time devoted to the generation of inventions that will lead to a university-
owned patent is time that could equally be spent on joint research that could lead to a 
business patent with university inventors, and vice versa. Do countries overcome this 
individual trade-off effectively at aggregate level? 
 
                                            
22 Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161, p.14. 
23 Commission communication ‘Delivering on the modernisation agenda for universities: education, research 
and innovation’, COM(2006) 208. 
24 Commission recommendation ‘on the management of intellectual property in knowledge transfer activities 
and Code of Practice for universities and other public research organisations’, COM(2008) 1329, p.5. 
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Figure 1. The impact of the objective of ‘coping with diversification of funding’ (measured 
through business funding of R&D) in the production of university-owned patents in the EU 
and US 
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Again, some aggregate evidence to determine whether the objective of ‘encouraging 
performance’ complements university-owned patents would therefore be welcome to better 
tailor policies in this area. 
As aforementioned, university inventions patented by firms can be a measure for the 
objective of ‘encouraging performance'. However, these data do no exist and a proxy 
expressing potential university inventions patented by firms is used instead (see annex for 
details about how the proxy is derived). 
Such a proxy, so-called ‘space for business patents with university inventors’, is equal to 
the proportion of business patents over the sum of business patents and university 
patents, a share that ranges from 0 to 1. The pink line in Figure 2 shows that the higher 
the space for business patents with university inventors, the lower the number of 
university-owned patents. In other words, the more R&D policy supports the objective of 
‘encouraging performance’, the less university patent ownership will increase. 
In other words, the negative relation found in the econometric estimation between the 
space for business patents with university inventors and the number of university-owned 
patents means that, for a given country, the more universities are interested in owning 
patents, the fewer the penetration of university research in inventions by firms will be in 
that country. This is a problem because currently R&D policies have given incentives to 
promote university-owned patents and this negative relation with the penetration of 
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university inventive activity in firms is unexpected. One possible solution could be giving 
incentives to value also business patents with university inventors, a measure of the 
penetration of university inventive activity in firms. 
Figure 2. The impact of the objective of ‘encouraging performance’ (measured through 
business patents with university inventors) in the production of university-owned patents in 
the EU and US 
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Conclusions: complementing current metrics about 
university performance with statistics about business 
patents with university inventors 
Policy metrics often depend on policy objectives. In the EU, there is a diversity of policy 
objectives regarding the role of university patents and university-industry cooperation: 
‘effective knowledge sharing’, ‘strengthening research institutions’ and two of the sub-
objectives lying behind ‘strengthening research institutions’ – ‘coping with diversification of 
funding’ and ‘encouraging performance’. Hence, policy makers are increasingly using a 
broad range of metrics and there has been much debate about what metrics to be 
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included: number of university-owned patents, licensing income, contract incomes, 
consultancy incomes, etc. 
University-owned patents are thus not the only data for indicators on the collaborative 
activities between universities and industry. This work has attempted to provide an 
analytical framework to test how university-owned patents relate to some of these other 
indicators suggested as measures of the sub-objectives ‘strengthening research 
institutions’ related to university-industry cooperation: ‘coping with diversification of 
funding’ and ‘encouraging performance’. 
According to the results at aggregate level, the more R&D policy supports the objective of 
‘coping with diversification of funding’, the more university patent ownership will increase 
but the more R&D policy supports the objective of ‘encouraging performance’, the less 
university patent ownership will increase. 
The indicator on business patents with university inventors uses very little actual data 
because data do not exist, so the work does not provide definitive evidence about the 
latter negative relationship. However, the correct proxy design and its correlation to other 
experimental evidence justify its exploratory use for illustrative purposes (see discussion of 
limitations and advantages in the appendix). This work alerts about the possibility of an 
unintended policy consequence and therefore makes a plea for the generation of better 
data.25 While the data do not exist, the use of proxies is a fair attempt to produce 
quantitative results at aggregate level, which qualitative studies could complement. 
Current R&D policy can place considerable emphasis on having well endowed technology 
transfer offices to make good use of patents and on incorporating university-owned 
patents in the evaluation of researchers’ performance. Certainly, not all performance 
measurement systems monitor or incorporate such measures – indeed, in the UK, for 
example, the overemphasis on publications and the neglect of the measurements of 
technology transfer activity forms the basis of debate over the efficacy of current and 
proposed research assessment metrics. The situation, however, is somewhat different at 
the aggregate (institutional) level where metrics related to patents, licenses, etc. are 
important. In any further support to university-owned patents, governments could attempt 
to implement policies that promote complementarity between university patent ownership 
and the objective of ‘encouraging performance’ at aggregate level, since it is as desirable 
as the objective of ‘coping with diversification of funding’. Including business patents with 
university inventors in the debate about metrics to evaluate the performance of universities 
would be one way to achieve this goal. 
Appendix: Methodology and data 
We have gathered panel data on the number of university-owned patents and university 
R&D expenditure in millions of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) at 1995 prices from 
                                            
25 An undergoing project recommended by the European Science Foundation in 2008 aims at producing 
such data: ‘Academic patenting in Europe: database sharing, applications and extensions’, led by Francesco 
Lissoni, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Peter Lotz. 
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Eurostat’s online public database26. Since there are regular updates, it is worth noting that 
the data extraction dates from March to May to 2008. 
Data on patents refer to applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), at 
international phase, designating the European Patent Office (EPO). Years are those of the 
priority date, which are more meaningful from a technological or economic point of view 
than the application or the grant date27 (OECD, 2001). Although the information dates back 
to 1977, the period of observation starts in 1982 to match the available information for the 
R&D variable. The year 2004 is the last one available with information on patents. It is 
therefore a 23-year period. Countries included in the sample are the 27 EU Member States 
and the US, i.e. 28. The panel has therefore 644 observations, but 38 percent are missing 
for university patents. The distinction among institutional sectors such as universities is 
possible after Eurostat’s project on Data Production Methods for Harmonised Patent 
Statistics28. 
A limitation of using EPO patents is the possible home advantage effect that will 
underestimate the number of US patents29. However, the numbers show that even at the 
EPO, US universities take out more patents than any single EU member state. In any 
case, in the broader context of firms, patents admit several critiques, such as being a 
mixture of discoveries with very heterogeneous impacts on innovation. One counter 
critique is that, if the number of patents is related to the equally dispersed value of R&D –
as done here–, differences cancel out30. In the specific case of universities and EPO 
patents, there are additional justifications. First, university patents are not a proxy of 
innovation but of the ownership of scientific results. Second, heterogeneity is less than for 
firms, because patents are more concentrated in science-based sectors31 and universities 
only apply through the EPO for their (potentially) most valuable inventions32. 
In order to find the determinants of the numbers of university-owned patents, we made an 
econometric estimation of the following function, with four independent variables: 
                                            
26 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&sc
reen=welcomeref&open=/&product=EU_science_technology_innovation&depth=2. 
27 OECD, 2001. Using Patent Counts for Cross-Country Comparisons of Technology Output. STI Review 27. 
28 Van Looy, B., du Plessis, M., Magerman, T., 2006. Data Production Methods for Harmonized Patent 
Indicators: Assignee sector allocation. Eurostat Working Paper and Studies, Luxembourg. 
29 Criscuolo, P. 2006. The ‘home advantage’ effect and patent families. A comparison of OECD triadic 
patents, the USPTO and the EPO. Scientometrics 66 (1): 23–41. 
30 Patel, P., Pavitt, K., 1995. Patterns of technological activity: their measurement and interpretation. In: 
Stoneman, P. (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, ch. 2. UK: 
Blackwell. 
31 Pavitt, K., 1998. Do patents reflect the useful research output of universities? Research evaluation 7 (2): 
105-11. 
Meyer-Krahmer, F., Schmoch, U., 1998. Science-based technologies: university-industry interactions in four 
fields. Research Policy, 27: 835-51. 
32 Azagra-Caro, J.M., Yegros-Yegros, A., Archontakis, F., 2006. What do university patent routes indicate at 
regional level? Scientometrics, 66 (1): 219-230. 
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Ln number of university-owned patents = α0 + 
+ α1 Ln university R&D expenditure in millions of PPS +  
+ α2 Share of business funding of university R&D expenditure + 
+ α3 Space for business patents with university inventors + 
+ α4 Ln firm patent/R&D ratio 
Similar methodologies appear in the academic literature, mostly focused on the US33 and 
occasionally on the EU, for national or case studies34. 
The first independent variable is: 
• Ln university R&D expenditure in millions of PPS: data refer to the extensively used 
measure that Eurostat compiles from national surveys, following the Frascati Manual. In 
order to put it in relation to the number of patents, there is a lag of one period in order to 
prevent some endogeneity. Endogeneity, in econometric terms, would happen if R&D 
expenditure were a determining factor of the number of patents at the same time that the 
number of patents was a determining factor of the level of R&D expenditure. It would be 
a problem for the econometric estimation because there would be a vicious circle. 
Through the one-year lag, the problem decreases. 
 
A one-year lag does not mean that it takes one year between spending money in R&D and 
applying for a patent, which we know is not necessarily the case. Rather, the assumption 
is that one year lagged R&D expenditure is a sufficiently good predictor of what will 
happen to patents in the next period, because one-year-old R&D expenditure already 
incorporates information from older R&D expenditure. 
A limitation of matching the patent and R&D databases is the sectoral distribution of 
hospitals. While patent statistics classify all hospitals into a single category, R&D statistics 
classify them among the remaining categories: business enterprise, government, higher 
education and private non-profit. Therefore, relating university patents to university R&D 
expenditure means that we will not include patents applied for by public, non-university, 
hospitals but we will count their R&D expenditure. In any case, the number of hospital 
patents is around 7 percent of academic patents, thus the difference is not likely to be 
dramatic. 
                                            
33 Among others: 
Coupé, T. 2003. Science is Golden: Academic R&D and University Patents. Journal of Technology Transfer, 
28, 31–46.  
Foltz, J., K. Kim and B. Barham 2003. A Dynamic Count Data Analysis of University Ag-Biotech Patents. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85 (1): 187-197. 
Payne, A.A., Siow, A., 2003. Does Federal Research Funding Increase University Research Output? 
Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, 3 (1): 1-22. 
Stephan, P., Black, G., Gurmu, S., 2006. The Knowledge Production Function for University Patenting. 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper Series 07-06. 
34 Among others: 
Azagra Caro, J.M., Fernández de Lucio, I., Gutiérrez Gracia, A., 2003. University patents: output and input 
indicators… of what? Research Evaluation, 12 (1): 5-16. 
Azagra-Caro, J.M., Carayol, N., Llerena, P., 2006. Patent Production at a European Research University: 
Exploratory Evidence at the Laboratory Level. Journal of Technology Transfer, 31 (3): 257-268. 
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Instead of expenditure on R&D, we have also used alternatively numbers of R&D 
personnel. The fit was always better for expenditure rather than personnel. We have used 
other human capital variables, like number of researchers or ratios of R&D expenditures 
over R&D personnel or researchers, but they did not affect the overall conclusion. 
The second and third independent variable included in the equation, which will be used to 
produce Figure 1 and Figure 2, are: 
• Share of business funding of university R&D expenditure: this corresponds to the 
breakdown of university expenditure on R&D according to its source of funding: share of 
business funding of university R&D, share of government funding of university R&D, 
share of other funding of university R&D. In the estimations, the share of business 
funding of university R&D is included and the sum of the other two shares (government 
and other funding) is the benchmark –because the effects of the share of government 
funding and the share of other funding are not significantly different one from each other 
• Space for business patents with university inventors: a proxy for the appearance of 
university staff as inventors of intellectual property expressed in patents not owned by 
universities but by business firms, calculated as: 
ntsowned pateniversity-patents+ uess-owned sinBu
patents ess-owned sinBu
= inventorsuniversitywithpatentsesssinbuforSpace     
The rationale behind this formula is that the denominator expresses the maximum number 
of patents in which university researchers can appear as inventors, whereas the numerator 
expresses the maximum number of business-owned patents in which university 
researchers can appear as inventors. Thus, the more business-owned patents has an 
economy, in relation to the total number of patents held by both business enterprises and 
universities, the more opportunities university staff have to appear in patents applied for by 
firms. 
The ratio would be equal to one if university staff only appeared as inventors in business 
patents and zero if they only appeared as inventors in university-owned patents. I.e. by 
design the variable works, as it should to express the potential proportion of business 
patents with university inventors: higher values of the variable indicate higher potential 
proportion of business patents with university inventors. 
Of course, this ratio is not a perfect measure, but the problem is that there are no data 
about the actual number of business patents with university inventors for the time and 
geographic scope we intend to analyse. We compared it to another attempt to measure 
the proportion of such patents in six European countries and obtained similar results for 
universities, as we can see in Table 3. The country ranking provided by both measures is 
the same, which gives some validity to our proxy. 
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Table 3. Two measures of business patents with university inventors in six European 
countries 
Country Share of business patents with 
university inventors over all 
university patents35  
Space for business patents with 
university inventors 
France 88.33% 99.29% 
Germany 96.30% 99.76% 
Italy 96.00% 99.52% 
Netherlands 79.66% 98.85% 
Spain 47.06% 97.12% 
UK 67.63% 97.30% 
 
One could intuitively argue that since the proxy is an inverse ratio dependent on the 
number of university-owned patents, one would expect nothing else but a negative 
relation. This would happen, only if we hold everything else constant. The example of 
Table 4 shows that this is not necessarily the case. 
Table 4. Hypothetical scenarios to understand how it works the relation between the 
number of university-owned patents and the space for business patents with university 
inventors 
 
Variable 
 
 
Year 
Number of 
university-owned 
patents 
Number of 
business-owned 
patents 
Space for business 
patents with 
university inventors 
Type of relation 
between ‘Number 
of university-owned 
patents’ and 
‘Space for business 
patents with 
university 
inventors’ 
2009 1 1 0.5  
2010a 2 1 0.33 Negative 
2010b 2 2 0.5 None 
2010c 2 3 0.6 Positive 
 
Following Table 4, let us consider that a given country has one university patent and one 
business patent in 2009. In 2010, the number of university patents increases to two. 
According to whether the increase of business patents is lower, equal or higher than two, 
the relation between the number of university-owned patents and the space for business 
patents with university inventors will be negative, none or positive, respectively.  
The same range of possibilities exists for a given year across countries. The fact that, in 
the econometric estimations, there is a one-year lag between the number of university-
owned patents and the space for business patents with university inventors enhances 
randomness in the relation. The empirical evidence actually confirms that the pairwise 
                                            
35 Crespi, G.A., Geuna, A., Verspagen, B., 2006. University IPRs and Knowledge Transfer. Is the IPR 
ownership model more efficient? SPRU Working Papers 154. 
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correlation is close to zero (and even positive), which reinforces the argument against an 
intuitively expected negative relation. 
Finally, the equation that we will estimate also includes as a fourth independent variable: 
• Ln firm patent/R&D ratio: it expresses firms’ propensity to patent, measured through the 
ratio of the number of patents owned by business firms over the business firms’ 
expenditure on R&D. ‘Firms’ here are all firms in a given country and year 
 
To produce the estimations, we have run panel regressions, testing classical regression 
models against fixed effects models and random effects models. The preferred model was 
a fixed effects one, with country and year effects. The results are in Table 5. 
Table 5. Determinants of university-owned patents in the EU and US 
 
 
Ordinary least squares regression with country 
and year effects 
Dependent variable Ln number of university-owned patents 
Number of observations 290 
R2 .95 
Adjusted R2 .95 
  
Variable Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Constant 16.07 (13.19) 
Ln university R&D expenditure in millions of PPS .30 (3.49) 
Share of business funding of university R&D expenditure 4.88 (3.63) 
Space for business patents with university inventors -15.24 (-13.01) 
Ln firm patent/R&D ratio .88 (11.10) 
 
Notice that 4.88 and -15.24, in the shaded areas, are the coefficients used to draw Figure 
1 and Figure 2.36 
                                            
36 For explanations about the other results and further work, see Azagra-Caro, J.M., 2008. Patents owned by 
public research centres: EU vs. US, universities vs. PROs, 3rd Annual Conference of the EPIP 
Association, Bern (Switzerland), 3-4 October, in: http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip03/papers/Azagra-
Caro_Euracapat%201%20-%20EPIP.pdf, last access: 26/05/2009. 
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